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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
in the board to devise punitive measures.9 The affirmative action of
the board is limited to an adjustment between employer and employee
to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act. The
board is not empowered to rectify losses sustained by governmental
agencies in connection with work relief,10 for if such function had
been intended, the legislature would have expressly conferred it upon
the board. The board's orders must be addressed to employees and
employers for the purpose of adjusting their conflicting interests and
compensating employees 11 for what they have lost through discrim-
inatory discharge.
Although the courts have maintained that the policy of the Act
is, essentially, remedial and that orders of the board must also be re-
medial in nature, we are still faced with the actuality that the employer
is penalized when he is ordered to pay back pay to a wrongfully dis-
charged employee for his period of unemployment for he is compelled
to pay something for which he received no benefits. However, had
the legislature been more explicit and precise in defining the affirma-
tive action that the board should take, then the courts would not have




testator executed and delivered to plaintiff a real property mortgage
on December 29, 1932. Having defaulted in the terms of the mort-
gage, this action was brought by plaintiff to foreclose and satisfy its
lien. Upon the sale of the property a deficiency owing plaintiff-
mortgagee, amounting to $16,162.12, was found by the referee. By
virtue of the new amendment to Section 1083 of the Civil Practice Act
N. L. R. B. is to recognize and furnish means of enforcing the rights of labor
to. deal on an equal footing with employers).
9 N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240, 59 Sup. Ct.
490 (1939) (the statutory authority of the N. L. R. B. to require "affirmative
action". to "effectuate the policies of the Act" is broad, but not unlimited, is
remedial, but not punitive, and is to be exercised in aid of the board's authority
to restrain violations and avoid or remove the consequences of violations which
may tend to thwart the purposes of the Act. The Court held it was beyond the
board's power to order reinstatement of employees who participated in criminal
acts, for that would not effectuate the policies of the Act). Comtra: N. L. . B.
v. Carlisle Co., 99 F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938), cert. denied, 306 U. S. 646,
59 Sup. Ct. 586 (1939). The purpose of this section was not to reward em-
ployees, but to punish employers who were guilty of unfair labor practices,
therefore, the Court should not construe provisions on the basis of what might
be considered just between employer and employees, but should endeavor to
ascertain the intent of Congress. International Ass'n v. N. L. R. B., 110 F.(2d) 29 (App. D. C. 1939), af'd, 311 U. S. 72, 61 Sup. Ct 83 (1940).
10 See note 5, supra.
" Note (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1265.
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enacted in 1938, the Appellate Division ruled that since no motion for
a deficiency judgment had been made.as prescribed therein, the order
of the Special Term should be modified by striking therefrom the
direction for entry of a deficiency judgment. Held, reversed. Sec-
tion 1083 of the Civil Practice Act as amended by Chapter 510 of the
Laws of 1938 cannot be constitutionally applied to mortgage contracts
previously made. As to such contracts the former Section 1083 is in
force and effect. National City Bank of New York v. Gelfert, 284
N. Y. 13, 29 N. E. (2d) 449 (1940).
The new enactment 1 neither invokes the general welfare nor sets
up conditions pertinent to emergency relief. It, therefore, cannot be
deemed an act of police power passed by the legislature and applicable
to a given crisis. Even if this were true the results of this case would
be undisturbed inasmuch as the deficiency judgment act,2 defining the
limits of the emergency, makes it applicable only to mortgages exe-
cuted prior to the first day of July, 1932. We note that defendant
executed his mortgage to plaintiff on December 29, 1932.3 Section
1083, prior to amendment, has been interpreted to mean: that the
measure of a deficiency judgment was the residue of the debt remain-
ing unsatisfied after the application of the proceeds of a judicial sale
of the mortgaged premises pursuant to the directions contained in the
judgment of foreclosure and sale.4 This meant that the mortgagor
was entitled only to the net proceeds after deduction of liens or taxes,
etc., and burdened with resultant liability for any deficiency. 5 In view
of this construction the estate of the deceased mortgagor is liable for
any deficiency which the plaintiff is entitled to recover. The change
brought about by the amendment necessarily involves the question of
the right of the legislature to modify or change existing remedies with-
out impairing the obligation of contracts as guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution.7 It is well settled that the legislature may modify exist-
ing remedies or prescribe new modes of procedure without impairing
the obligation of contracts, providing a substantial remedy is substi-
tuted by which the parties may without embarrassment and undue
delay enforce their rights under the contract." However, under the
remedy as substituted by the amended Section 1083 of the Civil Prac-
tice Act it is apparent that the legislature not only modified and
changed the remedy left to the parties of the contract, but it so
1 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 1083 (". . . If no motion for a deficiency judgment
shall be made as herein prescribed the proceeds of the sale regardless of amount
shall be deemed to be in full satisfaction of the mortgage debt.. .").
2 N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 1083-a.
3 Chase v. Harvey, 253 App. Div. 15, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 541 (3d Dept. 1937);
Syracuse Trust Co. v. Corey, 167 Misc_506, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 349 (1938).
4 Morris v. Morange, 38 N. Y. 172 (1868) ; Frank v. Davis, 135 N. Y. 275,
31 N. E. 1100 (1892).
5 Marshall v. Davis, 78 N. Y. 414 (1879).
6 See note 1, supra.
7 U. S. CoNsr. Art. I, § 10.
8 Osh Kosh Waterworks v. Osh Kosh, 187 U. S. 437, 23 Sup. Ct. 234
(1903).
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impaired their rights existing under the contract at the time of execu-
tion thereof that to hold it applicable would clearly be a violation of
the Constitution. 9 The remedy, to be applied retroactively, must be
substantial substitution for the rights acquired by each party at the
time the obligations are incurred.
E. R. D.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT-LIMITING EMPLOYER'S
FREEDOM OF SPEECHI-BOARD'S CONFORMITY TO JUDICIAL STAND-
ARDS.-Empoyees found written notices in their pay envelopes stating
that as the plant was always going to operate as an "open shop" they
need not join a union, and that the defendant company would deal indi-
vidually with any employees so desiring.' Relations between defen-
dant and employees became strained, and a strike ensued. A com-
pany union was fostered by the defendant who signed a contract with
it.2 Findings of fact made by a trial examiner were reversed by the
National Labor Relations Board. The Board found the company
guilty of unfair labor practices and ordered it to rehire the strikers,
to cease giving effect to the contract with the company-dominated
union and to post proper notices which would proclaim that defendant
had violated the law. The entire order was affirmed in the Circuit
Court of Appeals.3 On appeal, held, certiorari denied. N. L. R. B.
v. Elkland Leather Co., Inc., - U. S. -, 61 Sup. Ct. 170 (1940).
The defendant contended that the constitutional guaranty of
free speech protected its "open shop" statement and, if the National
Labor Relations Act sought to embrace that writing as an unfair labor
practice, 4 the Act was unconstitutional as contrary to the First
Amendment.5 The right of free speech is a qualified, not an absolute
right.6 Employees have a right to organize and to bargain collec-
9 Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118, 16 Sup. Ct. 1042 (1896).
1 "You are under no obligation to join any union and cannot be forced to
do so as this tannery will always operate as an open shop. This company will
deal individually with any employee that wishes to do so at any time."
2 Elkland Leather Workers Association, Inc.
3 114 F. (2d) 221 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940).
4 49 STAT. 452, 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (1935) (It shall be unfair labor practice
for an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section seven...). 49 STAT. 452, 29 U. S.
C. A. § 157 (1935) ("Employees shall have the right to self-organization, . . . to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining. ... ").
5 U. S. CONsT. AmEND. I ("Congress shall make no law abridging freedom
of speech .... ).
6 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 281, 17 Sup. Ct. 326 (1897); United
States v. Toledo Newspaper Co., 247 U. S. 402, 38 Sup. Ct. 560 (1918);
Frowerke v. United States, 249 U. S. 204, 39 Sup. Ct. 249 (1919).
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